The lighting is good; indeed, you feel the pages pressing on your hands — this is no illusion. But think of stories like The Matrix or Vanilla Sky.
How can you really be sure that any of this is real? Perhaps you are simply part of a computer-generated virtual reality, created by an omnipotent supercomputer of unthinkable proportions. Is there some way to rule out such a scenario? Our first section explores the aforementioned issue of the reality of the ex- ternal world. Does the world around you — the people you encounter, the book you are now reading, indeed, even your hand — really exist?
Represented in this section are the aforementioned ideas of both Plato and Descartes; such provide essential philosophical background for this topic. While reading the pieces in the section, as well as other sections of the book, readers may wish to view or read one or more of the science fiction works named in the section titles. Relatedly, instructors using this book for their courses may want their students to do so. In particular, they may consider screening the Star Trek episodes I list, as they are short, leaving time for in class discussion.
The next piece in the section develops the issue of external world skepticism in a stunning new direction, suggesting that virtual reality science fiction thought experiments depict science fact. For philosopher Nick Bostrom has recently offered an influential argument that we are, in fact, in a computer simulation.
He observes that assuming that a civilization survives long enough to be tech- nologically sophisticated, it would likely be very interested in running simula- tions of entire worlds. In this case, there would be vastly more computer simulations, compared to just one real world. And if this is so, there would be many more beings who are in a simulation than beings who are not. Bostrom then infers that given this, it is more likely than not that we are in a simula- tion.
Because the argument claims that it is more likely than not that we are in a simulation it does not rely on remote philosophical possibil- ities. To the skeptic, the mere possibility of deceit means that we cannot know the external world exists; for the skeptic holds that we must be certain of some- thing in order to truly say that we know it. On the other hand, opponents of external world skepticism have argued that just because a skeptical scenario seems possible, it does not follow that we fail to know the external world exists.
That the world we know is a computer simulation is no remote possibility — more likely than not, this is how the world actually is. Part I also features a related piece by philosopher David J. Instead, he aims to deflate the significance of know- ing we are in a simulation. Chalmers asks: why would knowing that we are in a simulation prove that the external world skeptic is correct? He writes: I think that even if I am in a matrix, my world is perfectly real.
A brain in a vat is not massively deluded at least if it has always been in the vat. Neo does not have massively false beliefs about the external world. If so, the Matrix Hypothesis is not a skeptical hypothesis, and its possibility does not undercut everything that I think I know. Chapter 5, p. Suppose that we learn we are in a matrix. According to Chalmers, this fact tells us about the nature of the external world: it tells us that the physical world around us is ultim- ately made of bits, and that our creators were creatures who allowed our minds to interact with this world of bits.
But upon reflection, knowing a new theory of the fundamental nature of the universe is just learning more physics. And while intriguing, this is not like proving that skepticism is true. Furthermore, learning that there is a creator outside of space and time who allowed our minds to interact with the physical world, while obviously of great meta- physical and personal import, is akin to learning that a particular religious view holds.
This would be an earth shattering revelation, but it does not mean that we are not situated in the external world that we believe we are in. Suggestively, a very basic brain in a vat was recently developed at the uni- versity of Florida in the laboratory of Thomas De Marse. It now is sophisticated enough to successfully fly a flight simulator. It also indicates that we are nearing the point at which we are capable of surviving the technological age long enough to develop more advanced simulations.
Some of the most lavish science fiction thought experiments are no longer merely fictions — we see glimpses of them on the technological horizon. Indeed, this could even be the case if we are not living in a simulation.
Many cognitive scientists suspect that the brain is a kind of computational system, and that relatedly, the person is fundamentally a sort of computational being. But is informational patternism correct?
The plausibility of informational pat- ternism and other theories of personal identity is pursued throughout the sec- tion. The first piece in the section Chapter 6 is a science fiction tale by the well-known philosopher Daniel Dennett. Dennett is sent on a bomb diffusing mission by NASA, and his out of body adventures test the limits of leading theories of personal identity, especially informational patternism. Finally, any discussion of persons should at least touch upon the related topic of the nature of free will.
After all, as you reflect on your very nature, it is of great import to ask whether any of the actions which you seem to choose are really selected freely. Consider that from the vantage point of science, there is a sense in which every intentional action seems to be determined by either genetics or environment, or a combination of both. And every physical event in the brain has, at least in principle, a causal explanation in terms of the be- havior of fundamental particles.
Further, recalling our earlier discussion of informational patternism, if persons are, at rock bottom, computational, are they even capa- ble of being free?
Some of the younger readers may eventually be like the cyborgs Bruce Sterling, William Gibson and other writers in the cyberpunk genre explore. And perhaps scientists will reverse-engineer the human brain, creating AI creatures that run the same algo- rithms as human brains do.
Other AI creatures could have minds that are entirely different, borrowing from sensory modalities that other animals have e. Existing human brains could be enhanced in these novel ways as well.
They also seem to support the related doctrine of informational patternism. Perhaps, for instance, our brains can be mapped out in terms of the language of a penultimate computational neuroscience yet we nonethe- less have souls. Are these two things really inconsistent? Or perhaps conscious- ness is a non-physical, non-computational, feature of the brain. The debate rages on in philosophy of mind. In this section, we explore some of these issues, rais- ing thought provoking points of contact between science fiction, philosophy of mind, and science fact.
The second piece in this section is also a work of science fiction. The different subcomponents are wired together by evolution and experience to do important tasks. The next few pieces provide essential background for under- standing and critiquing the computational approach to the mind.
Human minds are already both computational and integrated with the larger technological world around us. Such is our cyborg nature. Now consider the android Rachel in Philip K. These characters in effect push at the boundaries of our ordinary understanding of a person.
The audience ponders whether such creatures can really understand, or be conscious. Intriguingly, if our own minds are compu- tational, or if a person is just an embodied informational pattern, then perhaps there is no difference in kind between us and them.
John Searle would suggest otherwise. In his book, The Singularity is Near, he sketches a future world in which we or perhaps our children or grandchildren become cyborgs, and eventually entirely artificial beings. The first few sections have looked at the epistemology and meta- physics of selves and their minds; now, in Part IV, we consider certain ethical issues.
Inspired by his sentiments about American culture, Brave New World depicts a technologically advanced society in which everyone is com- placent yet where the family has withered away and child bearing is no longer a natural process. Instead, children are bred in centers where, via genetic engin- eering, there are five distinct castes. Only the top two exhibit genetic variation; the other castes are multiple clones of one fertilization.
All members of society are trained to strongly identify with their caste, and to appreciate whatever is good for society, especially the constant consumption of goods and, in particular, the mild hallucinogen Soma that makes everyone blissful.
Like Huxley, George Annas is intensely con- cerned with the social impact of genetic engineering and other enhancement technologies. His chapter employs themes from science fiction to motivate his case against genetic engineering. They will be more like certain cyborg and virtual creatures depicted in science fiction stories Bostrom As exciting as transhumanism may be to science fiction enthusiasts, Schneider stresses that the transhumanists, who generally adopt infor- mational patternism, have as of yet to provide a plausible account of the nature of persons.
In particular, there is no feasible sense in which this notion of a per- son allows that a person can persist throughout radical enhancements, let alone even mild ones.
Although she considers various ways that the transhumanist might furnish patternism with better conceptual resources, her suspicion is that informational patternism is itself deeply flawed. A common point of agreement between transhumanists and bioconservatives who oppose enhancement is a concern that the development of artificial intelli- gence, biological weapons, advanced nanotechnology and other technologies bring forth global catastrophic risks, that is, risks that carry the potential to inflict serious damage to human well-being across the planet.
The final two pieces of the section turn to the pressing issue of ethical dimensions of artificial intelligence and the existential risks its development may bring. The next piece explores ethical issues involving superintelligence. If humans construct AI, it may be that AI itself engineers its own future programming, evolving into a form of intelligence that goes well beyond human intelligence.
Or perhaps our descendants will be cyborgs that themselves upgrade to the level of superintelligence. In any case, a superintelligent being could engage in moral reasoning and make discoveries that are at a higher or different level than us, and which we cannot grasp sufficiently to judge.
This is one reason why the issue of ethical programming must be debated now; in hopes that the original motivations programmed into AI evolve into a superintelligence that is indeed benevolent. Believing that even the slightest change in the past can alter the future in momentous ways, travelers are instructed to use extreme diligence to leave the environment undisturbed.
For instance, they are not allowed to take trophies; they are only permitted to shoot animals that are about to die; and they are required to stay on a path hovering a bit above the ground. Needless to say, things go awry. Alex Rim Runa: Tipologjia e Antimoralizmit. Egocorpse Edition Alex Rim Runa ….
Mara-Daria Cojocaru: Passionate Animals. Passionate Animals: Emotions, Animal Ethics, and Moral Pragmatics draws on the theoretical achievements made in ethics, political philosophy, and human-animal studies, addressing the problem that the …. God provides for all life on earth. He always has. He always will. Our universe is held together by God.
He has given us so much. Let us all give thanks and praise to God. Make a new start to positiv ….
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